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The Meaning of the Holocaust for Bioethics
Abstract
Despite the central role played by the events leading to and during the Holocaust in bioethical discourse,
bioethicists have paid surprisingly little attention to examining the nature of the crimes committed in the
name of medicine and science, the moral rationales used to defend these crimes, or to the specifics of
history that do and do not find parallels in current public policies and moral disputes. The Center for
Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota convened a conference on May 17-19, 1989, to examine
some of these issues. The conference focused on five major themes: What role did mainstream medicine
and science play in the creation of the Nazi state; What did German scientists and physicians think about
and do in the name of eugenics and euthanasia; What moral rationales were used to justify the
involvement of medicine - and science with genocide, euthanasia, and racism; Should scientists and
physicians make any use of information obtained from barbarous experiments conducted on innocent
persons in concentration camps; and What is the appropriate use of metaphors and analogies to the Nazi
era in contemporary debates in bioethics?
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The Meaning of the
Holocaust for
Bioethics
Despite the central role played by
the events leading to and during the
Holocaust in bioethical discourse,
bioethicists have paid surprisingly
little attention to examining the
nature of the crimes committed in the
name of medicine and science, the
moral rationales used to defend these
crimes, or to the specifics of history
that do and do not find varallels in
current public policies and moral
disputes. The Center for Biomedical
Ethics at the University of Minnesota
convened a conference on May 1719, 1989, to examine some of these
issues. The conference focused on
five major themes: What role did
mainstream medicine and science
play in the creation of the Nazi state;
What did German scientists and
physicians think about and do in the
name of eugenics and euthanasia;
What moral rationales were used to
justify the involvement of medicine
-and science with genocide, euthanasia, and racism; Should scientists and
physicians make any use of information obtained from barbarous experiments conducted on innocent bersons in concentration camps; and
What is the appropriate use of
metaphors and analogies to the Nazi
era in contemporary debates in
bioethics?
Arthur Caplan, director of the
Center for Biomedical Ethics, Robert
Proctor, a historian at the New School
for Social Research in New York, and
Benno Muller-Hill, a geneticist at the
University of Cologne, all argued that
the racist underpinnings of Nazi
ideology were firmly rooted in the
racial hygiene theories prominent in
German biology during the 1920sand
30s-long before Hitler came to
power. Proctor argued, moreover,that
Nazism was not a philosophy
espoused on the fringes of German
medicine and science. Rather, it was
an ideology with roots deep in the
mainstream of German biology,
medicine, and public health, and
German physicians enrolled in the
Nazi party at a rate three times higher
than any other profession.

Jay Katz, professor of law at Yale
University, reviewed the atrocities
perpetrated by Nazi scientists in the
name of scientific research. Katz
maintained that the ability to undertake murderous science was
grounded in five norms: Obedience
to authority; a commitment to racial
superiority; a coilcern for the security
and well-being of the state in time
of war; a belief in the importance of
scientific progress; and an ethos of
professionalism that held that
patients' interests were best served by
trusting their doctors. Katz indicated
that these latter two norms still linger
in the contemporary scientific and
medical research enterprise and
threaten to erode respect for persons
as subjects or patients in the interest
of advancing knowledge.
Caplan reviewed the moral rationales advanced by Nazi physicians at
the Nuremburg trials. He noted that
the German physicians who administered the euthanasia program,
supervised mass genocide, and conducted brutal experiments on Jews
and other groups in concentration
camps grounded their actions on
utilitarian principles. The state was
justified in demanding the sacrifice
of the minority to advance the
interests of the majority-only those
"doomed to die" were selected for
research involving lethal experiments. Moreover, total war demanded
both complete obedience to legitimate state authority and conformity

with the reauests of the state to obtain
knowledge ' that could advance the
war effort. Caplan noted that the
doctrine of informed, voluntary
consent that emerged in the Nuremburg Code and later in the Helsinki
Declaration was a direct response to
these attempts at moral justification
of
Ruth Macklin, professor of bioethics at the Albert Einstein School
of Medicine in New York, indicated
there are important parallels between
the rationales used to justify Nazi
euthanasia programs and current
arguments. But, she argued, conceptual caution must be exercised in
seeking parallels since not all instances of termination of treatment
constitute euthanasia. For the most
part, Nazi policies involved active and
involuntary euthanasia while contemporary debates focus on voluntary
acts of either active or passive
euthanasia. Moreover. the moral
justifications given by Nazi doctors for
active euthanasia often differed from
those invoked currently. However,
Macklin noted that German physicians were particularly concerned
about wasteful social expenditures on
persons they viewed as not "costworthy." She maintained that the
most dangerous basis for slipping
down the slope to abuse is when
economics and ethics are systematically confused.
Perhaps the most emotionally
trying portion of the conference
centered in the ethics of using
information obtained from innocent
persons in concentration camps.
Robert Pozos, a physiologist at the
University of Washington, argued that
Nazi research on hypothermia, while
cruel and often fatal, was conducted
in a manner capable of producing
useful, important, and potentially lifesaving results. Such experiments
provide the only available source of
information about exvosure to fatally
cold temperatures. Pozos's claims
provoked a heated and often passionate resDonse. Two survivors bf medical experiments at Auschwitz, Susan
Seiler Vigorito and Eva Kor, argued
that to use any data from Nazi
experiments was to be complicit with
absolute evil and lend dignity to the
crimes. Others maintained that if the
information could save lives, it ought
u
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to be used, while Robert Berger, a
survivor who became professor of
surgery at Harvard, questioned the
claim that the findings from hypothermia experiments had any scientific validity or were the sole source
of information about exposure to cold
temperatures.
No consensus emerged about the
ethics of using Nazi findings. But it
did become clear that the issue of
whether Nazi science should be used
or cited is misstated. Nazi data and
the claims of Nazi science in areas
such as genetics, physiology, pathology, anthropology, and psychiatry
have in the past been studied, cited,
and absorbed into mainstream science with little comment It is important to ask why the question of using
the findings of Nazi science did not
surface until four decades after the
collapse of the Third Reich.-Arthur
L. Caplan

Searching for
International
Consensus
A group of thirty-five physicians
and ethicists from ten countries has
produced "The Appleton Consensus:
Suggested International Guidelines
for Decisions to Forgo Medical
Treatment" (published in the March
edition of the Journal of the Danish
Medical Association). The guidelines
apply to decisions in four different
caie&ories:(1) competent patients or
patients who executed an advance
directive before becoming incompetent, (2) previously competent
~atients.who have not issued an
advance directive, (3) patients who
have never been competent,
(4) decisions in any of these categories significantly influenced by scarcity of medical resources.

The first section affirms that lifeprolonging treatment should not be
imposed on patients against their will;
that advance directives by competent
patients to reject treatment should be
respected, that even while respecting
treatment refusals, institutions have
an obligation to continue to offer
supportive care; and that requests,
including advance directives, to
continue life-prolonging treatment
should also be respected except in
certain specified circumstances-one
of which is scarcity. In regard to
requests for active euthanasia, the
statement affirms in four terse sentences that there are conditions
under which such requests may be
justified; that this does not necessarily
mean that such requests should be
honored; that doctors have an obligation to "provide a peaceful, dignified, and humane death with minimal
suffering"; and that at this time it
would be "against the public interest"
to legalize the "intentional killing of
patients by physicians." This portion
of the statement reveals important
areas of disagreement from two
directions. Three signatories dissented, claiming that active euthanasia is not only contrary to the public
interest, but a violation of basic
morality. Several other signatoriesfelt
that it was not clear, especially in light
of several recent polls in the U.S., that
legalizing euthanasia would in fact be
contrary to the public interest.
For decisions about patients who
were once competent but are not now
competent and who have not executed a n advance directive, the
statement affirms the desirability of
discovering in so far as possible what
the patient would have wanted done.
If efforts fail to reconstruct reliable
substituted judgment, the statement
endorses reliance on a best interest
test (defined as "what would most
generally be thought to advance most
such patients' interests"). The examples of interest it might be presumed
"most such patients" would endorse
omits any reference to simple continuation of life. Indeed, the signatories specifically reject "the simple
vitalist assumption that prolonging
life is always in a patient's interests."
They affirm that active euthanasia,
"as distinguished from forgoing
treatment that is deemed inappropri-

ate, has no place in the treatment of
permanently incapacitated patients."
On the other hand, the statement
affirms (with five dissents registered)
that patients in a "reliably diagnosed"
persistent vegetative state (PVS) can
have "no self-regarding interest," and
that life-prolonging treatment in such
cases mav be discontinued.
The s&tement affirms the necessity
of setting reasonable limits in providing life-prolonging treatment for
patients who have never been competent, specifically endorses the
"weighing of the ratio of benefits and
burdens" as a tool in assessing such
limits, and catalogues the interests
that may conflict and may require
protection in these decisions. However, decisional discretion guided by
the clinical wisdom of a trustworthy
doctor more than any "layers of
external mandatory audit" will be
most valuable in interpreting those
limits and interests and resolving
those conflicts.
As the signatories themselves
acknowledged,the section addressing
decisions influenced by scarcity is the
document's weakest part. However,
three very important areas of agreement appear: (1) the recognition of
the inevitability of scarcity and the
necessity to make choices between
alternative uses of scarce resources,
(2) the recognition that those choices
should be open and undisguised, and
(3) the endorsement of costeffectiveness analysis as an indispensible tool in responsibly addressing
M.
problems of scarcity.-John
Stanley
[Offprints of The Appleton Consensus can be obtained from John
M. Stanley, Lawrence University
Program in Biomedical Ethics, Box
599, Appleton, WI 54911.]

